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In 2007, a challenge to Indiana's voter identification law came before the Seventh Circuit in Crawford v. Marion County Election danger of [voter identification] fraud," the dissent argued, " [t] here is only one motivation for imposing burdens on voting . . . and that is to discourage voting by persons likely to vote against the party responsible for imposing the burdens." 12 Crawford's presumptively neutral voter identification laws were now, according to the dissent, presumptively political.
The dissent was shocking for a number of reasons, not the least of which was its comparison of the Wisconsin law to a literal witch hunt. 13 Perhaps most shocking was the identity of the dissent's author, Judge Richard Posner, who had teed up the Supreme Court's affirmation of a similar voter identification law only seven years earlier in Crawford. Facing critics' charges that he had recanted his position on voter identification laws, Judge Posner later explained his reversal on empirical, as opposed to legal or normative, grounds: he simply did not have enough information in Crawford to sniff out the Indiana statute's political motivation.
14 "[I]n common with many other judges," Judge Posner explained, "I could not be confident that [my opinion] was right, since I am one of the judges who doesn't understand the electoral process sufficiently well to be able to gauge the consequences of decisions dealing with that process." 15 Federal judges often confront cases asking them to set precedent with less-than-complete information. 16 Because of the function of stare decisis in the federal judiciary, these judgments often have far-reaching and functionally permanent consequences; Crawford, for instance, is unlikely to be overturned in the near future and, given its affirmation by the Supreme Court, the opinion binds parties not even remotely connected to the original litigation. At the trial level, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a partial remedy. Rule 24(a)(2) offers a party the right to intervene in ongoing litigation provided that the party meet three conditions: (1) the applicant has an interest implicated by the suit that (2) will be impaired unless the existing party adequately 12. Id. at 796. 13. Id. at 795 ("As there is no evidence that voter impersonation fraud is a problem, how can the fact that a legislature says it's a problem turn it into one? If the Wisconsin legislature says witches are a problem, shall Wisconsin courts be permitted to conduct witch trials?").
14. represents it, and (3) the existing party is inadequately representing the interest. 17 Thus, a party who might be affected by a given case-even if the effect is somewhat speculative 18 -has the right under Rule 24(a)(2) to make arguments the original party either refused or was incompetent to make, or to present additional evidence (of voter fraud, for example). 19 Although the text of Rule 24(a)(2) lays out only three requirements, several circuits have engrafted Article III's standing requirements onto the Rule, 20 creating an additional hurdle to thirdparty intervention. As a result, federal courts in these circuits are denied potentially relevant information from parties not immediately bound by a given case. Those same parties are denied the ability to represent their interests in precedent-setting litigation, and because lower federal courts adhere rigidly to stare decisis, these parties are effectively prevented from challenging precedents once set.
Academic commentary on the Rule 24(a)(2) circuit split has focused on whether Article III requires would-be intervenors to establish standing. 21 After declining on several occasions to address this issue, 22 the Supreme Court recently revisited this question in Town of 17 . FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (2) . 18. For cases that recognize adverse stare decisis effect as a cognizable interest under Rule 24(a) (2) , see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
19. For example, the defendant-intervenors in Grutter v. Bollinger-a pro-affirmative action nonprofit and seventeen minority students seeking admission to the University of Michiganargued that they would advance certain defenses of affirmative action that the University, subject to "internal and external institutional pressures," could not. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1999). The defendant-intervenors also argued that, because an adverse ruling would harm the University less than it would them, the University alone would "not defend the case as vigorously as [ 22. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) ("We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a) (2) , but also the requirements of Art. III.").
Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.
23 In a unanimous opinion, the Court narrowly held that intervenors under Rule 24(a)(2) must establish independent standing when the intervenor pursues relief not requested by a plaintiff. 24 As several commentators have noted, 25 the result in Town of Chester leaves open the question of whether an intervenor who seeks the same relief as a plaintiff needs to show independent Article III standing. The opinion also leaves unanswered the question of whether intervenors who seek no relief at all-including defendantintervenors, in most cases-need to satisfy Article III standing. With these questions still open, 26 this Note argues that the quasi-legislative character of judicial decisions and decisionmaking militates against imposing Article III standing on Rule 24(a) (2) intervenors when the intervenors do not request different relief.
Specifically, this Note argues that when judicial decisionmaking creates a quasi-legislative rule, as is the case with most opinions, courts' use of Article III standing to exclude would-be intervenors from this process raises two interrelated concerns. First, excluding additional parties decreases the volume and, potentially, the quality of information entering the process, thereby increasing the probability that the court will generate bad precedent. This is especially true when the original party's representation of a given interest is inadequate, a possibility the text of Rule 24(a)(2) openly acknowledges. 27 Second, a court's ruling effectively binds all future litigants within its jurisdiction. To varying extents, future litigants are thus denied the opportunity to be heard on the merits of their claims and defenses. Although this 26. The Court's opinion left open the possibility that standing could be required of intervenors seeking the same relief. Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1647 ("Thus, at the least, an intervenor of right must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond that which the plaintiff requests." (emphasis added)).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (entitling an interested party to intervene if their interest will be impaired "unless existing parties adequately represent that interest"); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendment ("The general purpose of original Rule 24(a)(2) was to entitle an absentee, purportedly represented by a party, to intervene in the action if he could establish with fair probability that the representation was inadequate.").
denial does not violate procedural due process, it does undermine the principles underlying the doctrine.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the circuit split, arguing that, despite Supreme Court rulings suggesting some resolution, the debate as to whether Article III applies or ought to apply to Rule 24(a) (2) intervention remains open. To the extent that the Supreme Court has considered the issue, its precedents suggest that Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors requesting the same relief need not demonstrate independent Article III standing. Part II considers the scope and effect of stare decisis, arguing that the doctrine-if not for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention-denies the federal judiciary potentially important information and denies would-be intervenors the ability to fully defend their interests. For instance, the Seventh Circuit is among the minority of circuits requiring independent Article III standing of Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors. 28 Were it otherwise, the court in Crawford could have benefited from the intervention of public interest groups specializing in election law, such as the Brennan Center for Justice, which was relegated to filing an amicus brief. 29 Finally, Part III evaluates the alternatives to Rule 24(a)(2) intervention-namely, the amicus brief and the political process-and ultimately argues that Rule 24 without a standing requirement best guards against the process errors discussed in Part II.
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE III STANDING, RULE 24(A)(2), AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT While the majority of this Note focuses on the information-and equity-related arguments against engrafting Article III's standing requirement onto Rule 24(a)(2) intervention, this Part focuses on the doctrine underlying Rule 24 intervention and standing, and the purposes both are meant to serve. This Part also argues that recent developments in standing jurisprudence cast serious doubt on some courts' arguments for requiring Article III standing of Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors. 
A. Rule 24(a)(2), Then and Now
Though it has some antecedents in Roman and civil law, the right to intervene in ongoing litigation is a relatively recent development in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 30 As with compulsory joinder under Rule 19 and class action under Rule 23, Rule 24 intervention arose in response to the modern recognition that "a lawsuit often is not merely a private fight and will have implications on those not named as parties."
31 Rule 24(b), the "permissive" subdivision of Rule 24, grants judges discretion to allow intervention by a party who has a "conditional right to intervene by a federal statute" 32 or "a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact."
33 Rule 24(a)(2), by contrast, allows intervention "of right," removing judges' discretion to disallow intervention so long as the would-be intervenor meets the Rule's conditions. 34 After its last substantive amendment in 1966, Rule 24(a)(2) reads, in relevant part:
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
35
It is worth noting that Rule 24(a)(2) emphasizes the "practical" nature of the impediment or impairment that triggers intervention of right. The pre-1966 Rule 24(a) (2) required that "the applicant [actually or potentially] be bound by a judgment in the action" 36 before she had the right to intervene. Though a minority of courts interpreted "bound" to mean practical prejudice, 37 [that] the res judicata test for determining whether an applicant for intervention in the action will be bound by the judgment therein is unworkable and inappropriate."). This was a fairly squishy standard. The Third Circuit, for example, required only affirmed the majority interpretation of "bound" as analogous to res judicata. 38 The 1966 amendment intentionally broadened harm cognizable under Rule 24(a)(2) to include not only res judicata, but "practical" impairment as well. 39 Furthermore, the 1966 amendment redefined the "interest" required from "an interest in property" to one also recognizing "less tangible interests." 40 The aggregate force of these changes was to "abandon[] formalistic restrictions in favor of 'practical considerations' to allow courts to reach pragmatic solutions to intervention problems." 41 As a result, the decade following the amendment saw a dramatic increase in public interest litigation-the reformed Rule 24(a)(2) had become better equipped to recognize the "relatively intangible, abstract" interests these organizations represent.
42
With greater scope came greater confusion. Whereas the more limited remit of the pre-1966 Rule lent itself to relatively straightforward judicial application, 43 the liberalized post-1966 Rule has proven considerably harder to apply. 44 In particular, the bounds of what can be considered a Rule 24(a)(2) "interest" are ill-defined, 45 and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on this point has provided unclear guidance. 46 that an applicant's rights would be "affected" by an adverse decision. Regardless, Lexmark can at least be seen to affirm the proposition that, once jurisdiction is established, standing cannot be used as a prudential bar to limit the public's access to the federal judiciary.
Of particular concern to this Note is Lexmark's elevation of the ban on generalized grievances to Article III status. The prohibition on generalized grievances-the adjudication of "abstract questions of wide public significance" 57 -exists "to limit the role of the courts in resolving public disputes. 73 which requires a judge to make a predictive, practical determination; standing requires that the there be a "causal connection" between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's conduct, 74 which requires a judge to make a retrospective empirical and legal determination. Rule 24 requires a showing that the plaintiff's interest will "as a practical matter" be "impair[ed]"; 75 standing's redressability prong requires the plaintiff to show that her requested relief will likely redress, not merely mitigate, her alleged injury.
76
Perhaps most significant, whereas Rule 24(a)(2) is a filtering mechanism meant to distinguish between parties who are entitled to intervene and parties who are not, Article III standing is a jurisdictional concept that defines and thereby limits the scope of the federal judiciary's power. 77 1984) for instance, the Court denied the parents of black public schoolchildren standing to challenge the IRS's failure to revoke the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools. Even though plaintiff's "request might have a substantial effect on the desegregation of public schools," the Court denied standing because the children's inability to attend desegregated schools "might not be traceable to IRS violations of the law." Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19.
77. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) ("[Standing] preserves the 'tripartite structure' of our Federal Government, prevents the Federal Judiciary from 'intrud[ing] upon the powers given to the other branches,' and 'confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016))); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) ("Federal judicial power is limited to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process."); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993) ("The legitimacy of an unelected, life-tenured judiciary in our democratic republic is bolstered by the constitutional limitation of that judiciary's power in Article III to actual 'cases' and 'controversies.'").
original parties, using standing as an additional filter against intervening parties displaces the role of Rule 24(a)(2).
C. The Minority Circuits' Approaches, Considered
The majority of circuits allow Rule 24 intervention without a showing of Article III standing. 78 The minority position-articulated by the Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. circuits-requires that a Rule 24 intervenor satisfy Article III standing. 79 The minority circuits' position rests on three distinct but interrelated justifications, which I refer to as the categorical approach, the floodgates concern, and the equal footing rationale. 95. For example, let's say our plaintiff from Lujan wants to intervene in an ongoing ESA suit, and her claims share a question of law or fact with the plaintiff's claims. Suppose, though, that her interest in the particular endangered species is not strong enough to satisfy Rule 24(a) (2) , meaning that it is also not strong enough to satisfy Article III standing (as she cannot have an injury without at least a strong interest). Will her Rule 24(b) motion succeed if she is required to satisfy Article III standing? No: she will fail because, given that she didn't have an interest sufficient for a Rule 24(a)(2) motion, she will not be able to satisfy Article III standing a fortiori. course of litigation." 96 As articulated by the Eighth Circuit, the fear is that courts will be turned into "judicial versions of college debating forums." 97 The circuits' concern with misuse of judicial resources is laudable, but the fear is misplaced.
First, it is doubtful as an empirical matter that the minority circuits' fear-that removing Article III standing from Rule 24 intervention will open the floodgates to any merely interested partyhas come to pass in the majority of circuits allowing intervention without standing. 98 Second, Rule 24(a)(2) contains three limiting criteria, all of which the prospective intervenor must meet. 99 It is unlikely that someone with a merely "philosophic identification" with a given defendant would have a sufficient interest under Rule 24(a) (2) or be able to show how an adverse ruling would "impair or impede" her ability to protect the interest.
Even if this is fear were well founded, Article III standing would be the wrong way to address it. Recall that the Supreme Court in Lexmark clarified that standing is strictly a matter of jurisdiction, not prudence, by reiterating the "virtually unflagging" requirement that "'a federal 3. The "Equal Footing" Rationale. The final rationale underlying the minority position is that if an "intervenor seeks to participate on an equal footing with the original parties to the suit, he must satisfy the standing requirements imposed on those parties."
105 Because "an intervenor may be seeking relief different from that sought by and of the original parties . . . [which] may make it really a new case,"
106 and because no case can be sustained without Article III standing, the potentially case-shifting intervenor must have standing. This is a fair concern, as Rule 24 intervenors are presumptively 107 given full-party status, allowing them to participate in practically all aspects of the trial. 108 If an intervenor so changes the focus of a case such that it no longer centers on the original plaintiff's claims, the adjudicating court may no longer have jurisdiction.
But this position overlooks two important points. First, many parties who seek to intervene do so only to present different arguments or evidence, not to request different relief. 109 In these cases, intervention functions in a similar way to an amicus brief, but with 
D. The Supreme Court's Sub Silentio Treatment
The Supreme Court has expressly declined to resolve whether Rule 24(a)(2) intervention requires Article III standing when the movant does not seek different relief. 114 Though the Court has not supplied a definitive answer, it has "sub silentio" endorsed the majority position. 115 In broadly, these decisions call into question the validity of applying Article III to Rule 24 intervenors at all. If the inclusion of an intervenor without standing does not destroy Article III jurisdiction, and if Article III is a jurisdictional limitation rather than a filtering mechanism, it is unclear how one could justify excluding intervenors without appealing to prudential concerns alone. Ultimately, if only prudential concerns justify application of Article III to intervenors, the minority position is all the more dubious after Lexmark.
II. RULE 24 AND THE TWO PROCESS CONCERNS OF STARE DECISIS
As Part I demonstrates, there is no conclusive answer to the question of whether Rule 24 requires that intervenors demonstrate Article III standing. Given this stalemate, the rest of this Note argues that two considerations-due process and the process of judicial decisionmaking-cut in favor of allowing parties to intervene without demonstrating standing. Because stare decisis requires courts to follow precedent, it is important that cases be decided correctly-that is, by taking into account the manifold ways a decision will affect future litigants-in the first instance.
A. The Scope of Strength of Stare Decisis
It was once a widely held view that "judicial opinions were of little import."
128 Principles of vertical and horizontal stare decisis required courts to follow the holdings of their superior (and sometimes coordinate) courts, but the opinions were virtually without force.
129
This argument still has its proponents, and there are a number of ways in which this position is formally correct.
130 But as anyone who has written a case brief can attest, those in the legal field-particularly attorneys-place substantial importance on the rationales of legal decisions, not just their holdings. This attention to legal opinions, as opposed to holdings alone, is well founded as courts often treat their opinions as if they set general rules for society that affect parties beyond the scope of the instant case. 131 secret. 132 Though the precedential weight we give to opinions reflects a fairness-driven preference for "treating like cases alike,"
133 it is also a functional requirement of our system. As the Ninth Circuit put it:
The Supreme Court cannot limit its constitutional adjudication to the narrow facts before it in a particular case. In the decision of individual cases the Court must and regularly does establish guidelines to govern a variety of situations related to that presented in the immediate case. The system could not function if lower courts were free to disregard such guidelines whenever they did not precisely match the facts of the case in which the guidelines were announced. 134 It is thus not surprising that people at all levels of the legal professionstudents, professors, lawyers, and judges-pay close attention to judicial opinions.
What is perhaps surprising is the preclusive effect courts give to opinions. It would be one thing if, as the Ninth Circuit describes, the broad reach of judicial opinions established flexible "guidelines" judges could apply with some discretion. In practice, however, judicial opinions are more binding than guiding. Once a judicial opinion is issued by an appellate court on a given matter of law, that interpretation will, absent extraordinary circumstances, 135 govern future cases within the same jurisdiction regardless of the arguments future parties may advance against it. 136 Horizontal stare decisis, which requires courts to follow their coordinate courts' decisions, functions primarily at the appellate level 137 where doctrinal rules require judges 132. See, e.g., Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules of law."); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("While individual cases turn upon the controversies between parties, or involve particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical consequences upon members of society at large.").
133 136. The exception to this rule is Rule 11, which allows a party to make "a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law." FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). For reasons discussed below, there is substantial risk in making this type of Rule 11 argument. For an explanation of the circumstances under which Rule 11 sanctions are levied, see infra note 177 and accompanying text.
137. Horizontal stare decisis is significantly less important at the district level, and sometimes completely unimportant. Courts in at most one district are required to follow intra-circuit precedent. See Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 843 (S. D. Ohio 2010) ("In the absence of to follow the decision of a previous panel unless a subsequent en banc or Supreme Court decision overrules it. 138 For example, if the Ninth Circuit holds in Litigant A's case that "no vehicles in the park" means literally no vehicles, Litigant B effectively cannot argue that the rule should apply only to certain types of vehicles. Horizontal stare decisis prevents any panel within the circuit from ruling contrary to a previous panel's decision. Litigant B's only recourse is to obtain en banc or Supreme Court review. But mere error correction is almost certainly not going to get him there. En banc review is granted only when a case presents a "question of exceptional importance" or one on which panels within the circuit have disagreed. 139 Similarly, the Supreme Court grants petitions for certiorari only when a case presents an issue of national importance or is one on which the circuit courts have split. 1927) (explaining that "the general rule [is] that a matter which is decided by any District Judge in this district should be, as a matter of comity, without re-examination by another judge, so decided"). In general, "federal district court decisions are treated like unpublished appellate decisions: they may be disregarded in future cases except for the purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel." Thomas R. Lee 154. This presumption is even stronger in certain contexts. For example, when a court interprets a federal statute and Congress fails to amend it, the lack of amendment is seen as approval of the court's interpretation. 
B. Stare Decisis's Process Problems
The strength of stare decisis in the federal judiciary implicates two separate processes. The first is procedural due process, which is undermined by stare decisis as practiced in the federal judiciary. The second is the judicial decisionmaking process, which is complicated by the epistemic constraints of case-based rulemaking and the adversarial presentation of evidence in our legal system. These two process concerns are considered below in turn.
1. Due Process. The Constitution twice guarantees that the government will not deprive anyone of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 155 In the context of judicial proceedings and other types of individualized adjudications, due process includes the right to be heard on the merit of one's claims and defenses.
156 By effectively foreclosing the litigation of certain issues decided in previous cases, stare decisis is in tension with this right: in a significant sense, stare decisis limits the ability to be heard in anything more than a literal sense on one's claims and defenses. For instance, a defendant who wants to argue that the employees of her riverboat casino are not "seamen" for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act is effectively barred in the Seventh Circuit from doing so, whether or not her arguments were heard in the precedent-setting case or the case was even decidedly correctly.
157
Federal courts have rarely addressed the tension between stare decisis and due process. When they have, their reasoning has been more obscuring than illuminating. In Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 158 the Seventh Circuit reversed a district judge for treating the precedent of another district court as outcome determinative in a sex discrimination suit.
159 Because "the parties to cases before us are entitled to [the judge's] independent judgment," the district court erred by treating the precedent as binding rather than persuasive. 160 163 Although these decisions pay some attention to the preclusive effects of stare decisis, it is unclear what they stand for. As one commentator has noted, "Dombeck and Colby raise more questions than they answer." 164 Both the Seventh and D.C. Circuits in these cases flagged the potential due process concerns underlying the issue-preclusive effects of stare decisis. By highlighting the nonbinding nature of other-circuit and other-district precedent, however, the courts imply that analogous precedent from an appropriate source would not present the same due process concern. 165 The salience of this distinction is less than clear. Precluding consideration of certain issues because of stare decisis burdens the right to be heard regardless of the precedent's source; whatever the precedent's pedigree, the instant litigant is effectively precluded by the resolution of someone else's case from making a claim in hers.
This blind spot likely owes to the traditional understanding of stare decisis. 166 In the common law, stare decisis was considered a doctrine that applied to judges rather than parties. In justifying the life tenure of federal judges, Alexander Hamilton explained:
To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. 167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2001) (emphasis added). stare decisis as "a doctrine that binds courts" but "does not bind parties." 168 Though that might be true in a formal sense, stare decisis inevitably affects future parties by binding judges to follow prior decisions: a judge who is commanded by stare decisis to follow a previous court's interpretation of "all vehicles" is a judge whose litigants effectively cannot contest that interpretation.
The judicial treatment of stare decisis is even more questionable when one compares it to the doctrine of issue preclusion. 169 Like stare decisis, issue preclusion promotes judicial efficiency and consistency by binding litigants to prior judgments of the same issue. 170 Unlike stare decisis, however, issue preclusion bars a party from litigating a certain issue only if the party had a "full and fair opportunity" 171 to do so previously. In contemporary doctrine, parties can be precluded from litigating an issue only if they were a party in previous litigation in which the issue was resolved, or if they were in privity with such a party. The doctrinal treatment of stare decisis, on the other hand, evinces no such concern for due process. Stare decisis assumes a prior resolution of a particular issue binds future parties, even if those parties had no hand in the precedent-setting litigation and thus had no opportunity to be heard.
172
The traditional explanation for why issue preclusion and stare decisis treat parties differently is the putative flexibility of stare decisis. 173 Issue preclusion is rigid-once an issue is settled, it is settled for the purposes of all litigation involving the same parties or privies. Stare decisis, on the other hand, is considered to be more flexible inasmuch as parties can distinguish their cases from precedent, appeal an unfavorable decision, or make nonfrivolous arguments that a precedent should be overruled. As intuitive as this seems, the distinction is greater in theory than in practice. There is a limit on the ability of courts to distinguish one case from another. 174 And the ability to distinguish does not make stare decisis any more flexible: the act of distinguishing a case is one of arguing why the instant facts are materially different from those of a precedential case. The act of distinguishing assumes stare decisis binds but argues that the instant case is not within the scope of the binding precedent.
At the appellate level, the ability to appeal turns entirely on the authority of the precedent-for example, appealing a district versus appellate court decision-and whether the appealed issue is sufficiently important to merit (re-)consideration in the context of en banc and Supreme Court appeals.
175 If the authority is sufficiently great, or the urged basis of appeal is mere error correction, one is unlikely to obtain review. Though Rule 11(b)(2) does allow one to make nonfrivolous arguments for the reversal of precedent, 176 the same Rule 11 mandates sanctions for arguments that are not "reasonable," 177 thereby deterring challenges to precedent. Moreover, because Rule 11(b)(2) challenges ask judges to render a decision despite the weight of precedent, such challenges are often likely to fail. Consequently, an attorney facing pressure from clients to reduce litigation costs is likely to stay away from Rule 11 arguments that, even when well made, are unlikely to persuade.
Under current doctrine, stare decisis and issue preclusion similarly preclude parties from relitigating issues once decided, yet due process limits only issue preclusion. But perhaps this is the wrong way to think 174. See Barrett, supra note 138, at 1021 ("A court's capacity for 'honest' distinguishing . . . does somewhat blunt a case's effect on later litigants. Court cannot, however, fairly distinguish every case.").
175. For an examination of stare decisis in the federal judiciary, see supra Part II.A. 176. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (allowing parties to make "a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law").
177. See Corroon v. Reeve, 258 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Rule 11 is violated when it is clear under existing precedents that a pleading has no chance of success and there is no reasonable argument to extend, modify, or reverse the law as it stands."). But see McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 511 U.S. 659, 660 (1994) (per curiam) (providing that an argument is not frivolous if, though "foreclosed by Circuit precedent," it concerns an issue that has "divided the District Courts and its answer [is] not so clear as to make [the] position frivolous").
of it. Maybe the explanation for courts' reluctance to apply due process to stare decisis has less to do with the effects of the two doctrines than with the relationship between precedent-setting courts and future litigants. As one commentator has noted, Colby and Dombeck could stand for the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees a full hearing on the merits of one's arguments only in matters of first impression. 178 Under this theory, a precedent-setting court would sit as adjudicator to the instant litigants, but would function like a legislative rulemaker as to future parties. Because legislatures and other rulemaking bodies are not required by due process to afford a hearing to potentially affected parties, 179 why should courts do so when acting in this capacity?
The Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence distinguishes between adjudicatory acts involving individualized deprivations of life, liberty, and property, and legislative enactments, which affect large groups of people.
180 Whereas adjudication requires procedural safeguards, the Supreme Court made clear in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization 181 that rights are protected from legislative deprivations by the political process. 182 The distinction between adjudications and legislative enactments, however, does little to resolve the issue posed by judicial rulemakings, which are adjudications in some senses and rulemakings in others. Instead, we must look to the rationale behind the adjudication-rulemaking distinction. When a legislature passes a broadly applicable law, citizens' "rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule."
183 Because the electoral process affords enough protection against bad lawmaking, due process does not require the right to be heard. Such a requirement would make impossible the already difficult task of enacting legislation. But when a decision affects only a few people, electoral redress is less significant a check on bad or unfair 178 decisionmaking. In such cases, due process requires the opportunity to be heard. 184 On this account, the degree to which an affected group is entitled to a hearing is inversely related to the degree of electoral control the group can potentially exert on the rulemaker.
Like generally applicable laws, precedents affect potentially very large groups of future litigants. Consequently, the sort of democratic coalition building Bi-Metallic contemplates as a means to correct an unpopular decision is possible. This, however, is where the story must end, for judicial opinions-though they may draw a broad and diverse crowd of opponents-are not readily subject to electoral change. Federal judges are, by design, rulemakers insulated from the electoral process. 185 And, although there are some judicial interpretations that can be changed through the legislative process, the Cooper v. Aaron 186 principle of judicial supremacy limits this to judicial interpretations of nonconstitutional law.
187 Absent from judicial precedent is the crucial ingredient-feasible political redressability 188 -that separates rules from adjudications in the context of due process.
2. Judicial Decisionmaking. The strength of stare decisis in the federal judiciary implicates another process: the decisionmaking process. The Constitution requires federal judicial rulemaking to take place in the context of concrete cases and controversies. This raises two concerns. First, the epistemic constraints of case-based decisionmaking inevitably lead judges to over-and underemphasize the importance of certain facts relative to the unknown facts of future cases that will come under the precedent's rule. Second, because parties in a case are most immediately concerned with winning, they have an incentive not to present information that, although it might be useful in the determination of the broader rule, is either contrary or neutral to their position in the litigation. 184 . Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385-86. 185. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing life tenure of federal judges); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 167, at 405 (arguing that "permanent tenure" is necessary for judges to serve as "bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments").
186 188. In a formal sense, disappointed parties have the ability to invalidate judicial interpretations of nonconstitutional, statutory law via the legislative process. But this ability is generally much more theoretical than it is practical. For an explanation of why the legislative process is often an inadequate means to overrule precedent, see infra Part III.B.3.
a. Bad Cases Make Bad Law, But So Can Good
Ones. Courtissued legal rules are products of the common law method, which, for reasons discussed below, can be a sub-optimal decisionmaking process. To understand the durability of the common law method, one must first understand the historical context in which it became a facet of American law. Writing in 1870, Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked that " [i] t is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards."
189 At the time, many still believed in the classical conception of law-that objectively correct legal answers could be deduced from universal principles of logic and morality. 190 Holmes knew better, 191 and the legal world is now generally disabused of the notion that positive law ultimately derives from transcendental principles of logic or morality. 192 But the presumption that the resolution of cases makes for good law-the common law method, as Holmes described it-is still baked into our legal structure. The Case or Controversy Clause, 193 from which the modern doctrine of standing derives, 194 requires that judges limit their jurisdiction to actual cases lest their opinion be merely advisory, and therefore prohibited. 195 Though standing has been justified on a number of grounds, one of the most frequently invoked is the doctrine's requirement that the plaintiff allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]" 196 If courts are confined to the information presented in the instant case, the rationale goes, that information should come from parties who are sufficiently motivated to make the best arguments.
Despite the common law method's undoubted advantages, there is reason to be skeptical. The common law method relies on the notion that judges will better resolve a given legal question if they have a live controversy before them. It is only with a live controversy, the argument goes, that judges can see how a given rule plays out in real life; it "sharpens the presentation of issues." 197 Were judges free to issue opinions absent a concrete case, they might fail to consider the unpredictable ways in which a given law is actually enforced.
198 Still, a case-based rulemaker is put in an awkward position. She must simultaneously resolve the immediate case and use the case's specific facts to determine a general rule to apply to similarly situated future parties. In determining the types of disputes that will fall under the rule, the facts of the immediate case create "a substantial risk that the common law rulemaker will be unduly influenced by the particular case before her." 199 This concern is less pressing if the immediate case is representative of future cases falling under the rule. But if the instant case is not representative of the class of cases that will fall under the future rule, the chance that a judge will place undue importance on the facts of the present case is high. Judges "make this (mis-)assessment [of representativeness] not on the basis of a rational survey of the class, and not on the basis of systematic empirical examination, but instead largely on the basis of the usually irrelevant factors of proximity or ease of recall."
200 This phenomenon, called the "availability heuristic," 201 is exacerbated by the phenomenon of "anchoring,"
202 through which the characteristics of the first event (a precedent-setting case, for instance) influence the estimation of subsequent events (hypothetical future parties to whom the precedent will apply, for example). Consequently, even a judge who is aware that future circumstances might differ from the present case-who, in other words, is aware of the availability heuristic's influence-might be unable to escape the anchoring influence the present case has on her ability to assess the field of future disputes.
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b. The Distortive Effect of Adversarial Information. The problems inherent in case-based rulemaking are not merely issues of framing and anchoring. The information presented in litigation is not only sometimes inadequate, but biased by design. Because parties in the adversarial context are trying to win rather than reach the best legal or factual conclusion, they are motivated to present less-thancomprehensive assessments of a given decision's legal ramifications.
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Even when litigants do not intentionally filter information in this fashion, the generalist nature of most lawyers and judges presents additional information-related concerns. Because generalist judges rely on the adversarial process to explain highly technical, specialized issues, process errors can occur when a given lawyer does not adequately understand the issue and, therefore, does not present the most relevant or reliable information. 205 The resulting decision may accordingly be distorted.
As the preceding Section argues, stare decisis poses two general process problems. The first concerns due process and, specifically, the preclusive effect stare decisis has on parties' ability to fully present their claims. The second concerns the judicial decisionmaking process and, in particular, the distortive effects of case-based decisionmaking and adversarial information. Though perhaps an unlikely hero, Rule Hardly an enclave of tax experts, the Supreme Court relies for illumination and protection on the validity of a basic assumption of the adversary process: that strong and effective advocates bring the issues into focus and marshal the strongest arguments for each side, thus educating the Court and helping it reach the best result.
Id.
24(a)(2)-unfettered by Article III standing-has the ability to greatly reduce the effect of these process problems.
III. INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY
In light of the problems outlined in Part II, commentators have proposed a more flexible approach to stare decisis 206 or a system of notice-and-comment judicial rulemaking. 207 There is much to be said for these and other proposals, but they would require federal legislation, a reconception of stare decisis, or both. As luck would have it, a far more practical remedy already exists in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 24(a)(2).
A. Rule 24(a)(2) and Stare Decisis's Process Errors
First, as discussed above at Part II.B, the preclusive effect of stare decisis can constrain a litigant's ability to argue certain issues such that, in some cases, one's right to a hearing seems like an empty formality. Rule 24 mitigates this effect by allowing parties who will potentially be subject to a given decision's precedential effect to intervene and influence the result. 208 For instance, imagine that a court is interpreting the government's application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to a manufacturer (Graft Foods) and a retailer (Fraud Meyer) who entered into a vertical agreement to fix a minimum resale price for a certain macaroni product. The Sherman Antitrust Act's text empowers the government to prohibit "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy[] in restraint of trade," 209 and asks that federal courts determine the types of behavior that fall under the Act's prohibition. 210 Vertical price restraints can be seen as a practice that inhibits 211 or 206. See Barrett, supra note 138, at 1060-61 ("Without flexibility, stare decisis functions as a doctrine of preclusion, and its application to nonparty litigants poses the same due process problem as the application of issue preclusion to nonparty litigants.").
207. See Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 128, at 967-68 (arguing that "[a]lthough it would represent a significant change," it seems "the case for notice-and-comment judicial decisionmaking is in most respects at least as strong as the case for notice-and-comment administrative rulemaking"). sometimes promotes 212 trade depending on the context, so the case could go either way. That is, the court could create a per se rule against vertical price restraints or create a more flexible standard that permits them when they are effectively procompetitive. Many industries comprising many parties will be affected by this ruling; vertical price restraints are not exactly a niche practice. 213 In this scenario, a straightforward application of Rule 24(a)(2) would entitle other companies to defend their interests by participating in the litigation. These parties, much like the intervenors in Grutter v. Bollinger, 214 might very well make arguments that Graft Foods and Fraud Meyer have incentives not to make. 215 Or perhaps vertical price restraints are not as important in the macaroni industry as they are in other sectors. Were this the case, Graft Foods might not argue the case as vigorously as would a company more significantly affected by a potentially adverse precedent. Requiring Article III standing would likely preclude many of these intervenors from defending their interests. Unlike under Rule 24(a)(2), an adverse stare decisis effect does not count among the injuries that satisfy Article III standing. 216 A party alleging stare decisis harm can intervene only if Article III does not apply to Rule 24(a) (2) .
It is important to note that Rule 24(a)(2) intervention can protect the interests of future litigants even when they themselves do not intervene. The greater the number of parties in the precedent-setting litigation, the greater the chance that one of the parties will anticipate the interests of future litigants. For instance, in the example above, if Shady Records, Inc. is allowed to intervene in the Graft Foods litigation, the interests of future music publishers will, in theory, be protected better than if Shady Records were excluded. Though this is no substitute for the right to be heard on one's own claims, this sort of virtual representation at least softens stare decisis's blow.
Similarly, Rule 24(a)(2) potentially ameliorates the rule-distorting effects of case-based adjudication, as discussed above in Part II.B.2. Although judges may still be influenced by the availability heuristic, the ability of other affected parties to intervene decreases the odds that the availability heuristic will lead judges to misconstrue the class of litigants to whom the rule will apply. In other words, as the number of parties increases, so too does the degree to which the instant parties represent the class of people who will later be affected by the decision's precedent. The effect of anchoring is similarly mitigated insofar as the characteristics by which judges assess the possible class of future litigants will be more representative of the class of people affected by the decision. And, lest judges be concerned that intervening parties will hijack the litigation, Rule 24(a)(2) allows judges the ability to limit the intervening parties' activities. 217 The benefits of allowing intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) without requiring Article III standing are even clearer when one considers how stare decisis affects the federal judiciary's legitimacy. The rest of this Note considers this relationship and evaluates the alternatives available to would-be intervenors. (2) and Legitimacy. Rule 24(a)(2)'s enhancement of the rulemaking process implicates a related judicial value: legitimacy. As Alexander Hamilton recognized in Federalist No. 78, the federal judiciary has "no influence over . . . the sword or the purse." 218 Consequently, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the federal judiciary's "power lies . . . in its legitimacy." 219 The public's perception of the judiciary's legitimacy is determined by a number of factors, foremost among them the degree to which a court's decisions and procedures comport with the public understanding of procedural justice. 220 Whether members of the general public consider a given legal decision procedurally just turns in large part on whether they feel they "have an opportunity to state their case to legal authorities" or otherwise "have a 'voice' in the decision-making process." 221 When a court renders a legal decision on the basis of arguments or facts never presented by the instant parties-in other words, when a court applies precedent-it loses legitimacy in the eyes of the instant parties insofar as they feel denied the right to be heard. 222 Though again not a perfect remedy, Rule 24(a)(2) allows parties who will be affected by a given precedent to intervene and defend their interest. Rule 24 gives these parties the right to be heard where they otherwise would not be. In addition, to the extent that Rule 24 encourages potentially affected parties to intervene, interests akin to those of all potential future parties-whether or not they personally had the opportunity to intervene-are more likely to have been represented when the precedent was set. Moreover, by increasing the court's exposure to different sources and greater volumes of information, Rule 24 also helps ensure the court's decision was not made on the basis of faulty, misrepresentative, or inadequate data. The greater likelihood that a court's decision is based on all of the relevant data, in turn, increases the public's confidence in the decision's fairness, and thus the court's legitimacy. And the sounder the decision, the less likely it is to be overruled, which similarly increases the court's legitimacy.
Rule 24(a)
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B. The Inadequacy of Alternative Remedies
The argument for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention uninhibited by Article III standing would be considerably less powerful if existing procedural remedies adequately accommodated the needs of third parties and the decisionmaking process. When one considers Rule 24's alternatives, however, the case for intervention of right becomes even clearer. 221 . Id. at 664. 222. Against this argument is the standard account of stare decisis as a guardian of a court's legitimacy. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 866 ("The legitimacy of the Court . . . fade [s] with the frequency of its vacillation."). But these arguments-one for representation and the other for stare decisis-are not mutually exclusive. The best way to accommodate both interests might be to allow interested parties to intervene in a case so that the resulting precedent better accommodates the interests of future parties it binds.
223. See id. (arguing that frequent judicial inconsistency is perceived as "evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short term").
knew the true nature of voter identification laws. 230 232 that "not a single Indiana resident has ever been indicted for impersonation fraud," 233 and that the study the district court relied on to uphold the voter identification law itself recognized that "wrongful disenfranchisement of voters is a 'far bigger problem' than voter fraud." 234 A person who files an amicus brief, it would seem, is a person who runs a substantial risk of being ignored.
Perhaps the likelihood of being ignored is actually a merit of the amicus brief. Judges too often rely on dubious amicus facts without independently confirming their accuracy. For instance, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 235 the Supreme Court had to determine whether the Constitution was violated when a state judge failed to recuse himself in a case involving a party who had spent $3 million on the judge's reelection campaign. 236 Dissenting from the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts argued that the contribution did not violate due process, citing an amicus brief for numerous "examples of judicial elections in which independent expenditures backfired and hurt the candidate's campaign." 237 The amicus brief cited a law review article, which itself had cited an email from a state judge that was "'on file with' the authors." 238 opinion and cited to in an amicus brief were not actually supported by any authority in the brief. 240 Frighteningly, these cases are not rare, isolated incidents. 241 Rule 24(a)(2) intervention shares none of these disadvantages. First, Rule 24(a)(2) enables intervention of right, which, at least in theory, is a right a judge cannot discretionarily deny if the intervenor satisfies Rule 24(a)(2)'s conditions. Second, because the information presented at trial by intervenors is the record, judges are considerably more likely to take intervenors' arguments and data seriously. As an upshot of being taken seriously, intervenors' arguments and data are more likely to be cross-examined by opposing counsel. Consequently, dubious data, of the sort sometimes found in amicus briefs, are less likely to enter the judicial decisionmaking calculus. In the status quo, by contrast, the perception of amicus briefs as unimportant serves as a disincentive to contest their facts. Even if a lawyer is inclined to contest opposing counsel's amicus facts, the sheer volume of amicus briefs at some levels of litigation makes this task nearly impossible.
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Intervention also offers tactical advantages amicus briefs cannot. For instance, parties intervening at the trial level have the ability, just like an original party, to preserve certain issues for appellate review. 243 Amicus briefs, on the other hand, can only respond to issues preserved by the parties on appeal.
244 Thus, parties who seek to shape the contours of a given judicial rule should prefer intervention to participation as an amicus.
Permissive Intervention under Rule 24(b). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b) enables judges to grant intervention permissively rather than of right. The requirements imposed by Rule 24(b) are significantly less demanding than those in Rule 24(a) (2) . In contrast to Rule 24(a)(2)'s tripartite requirement, Rule 24(b) asks only whether 240. Larsen, supra note 238, at 1785. 241. See id. at 1757-1800 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court has relied on dubious amicus facts).
242. See id., at 1764 ("The number of amicus briefs filed [in the Supreme Court] and the amount of seemingly legitimate information available to present makes it very unlikely that a litigant can adequately respond to amici-presented factual claims.").
243. This is an upshot of intervenors' presumptive status as full parties to the litigation. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Critically, however, an intervenor cannot actually appeal unless she has Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63 (1986) (noting that "status as a 'party' does not equate with status as an appellant").
244. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("There is no dispute that an amicus curiae may not raise new issues on appeal.").
otherwise: the rule of law could hardly take root in an amnesic judiciary, in which courts would be free to determine legal principles afresh in some Kafkaesque judicial version of Groundhog Day. 258 But the impulse to "treat[] like cases alike" 259 should not lead us to ignore two other important judicial values: accuracy and fairness. Stare decisis promotes the values of consistency, efficiency, and fairness it was designed to advance. At the same time, it has the potential to force reliance on suboptimal precedent and to deny parties the ability to be heard to the same extent as those who are first to litigate an issue.
Although hardly a cure-all, Rule 24(a)(2) mitigates stare decisis's process issues. Under Rule 24(a)(2), a party whose interest will potentially be impaired by a given case's stare decisis effect has the ability to intervene and so influence the result. Even when a future party cannot intervene itself, the probability that an intervenor's interests will anticipate-and in a sense represent-those of the future party increases under Rule 24(a) (2) . Perhaps more important, Rule 24(a)(2) intervention potentially increases the quality of judicial decisionmaking by increasing the amount of information and number of perspectives represented in a given case. Conveniently, Rule 24(a)(2) also provides a court the ability to limit the scope of an intervenor's participation, allowing judges to exploit the Rule's informative benefits while limiting procedural complication.
Requiring that intervenors satisfy Article III standing robs parties and the federal judiciary of these potential benefits. It would be one thing if Article III clearly applied to Rule 24(a) (2) . The Constitution has stood in the way of change before-that, fundamentally, is its purpose. But the use of Article III standing to bar intervention once a justiciable case or controversy has been established is an extraconstitutional use of the doctrine. In any event, it is a cruder-thannecessary tool to address the "floodgates" concern expressed by the Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.
The Brennan Center did not move to intervene in Crawford, and it is far from clear that its intervention would have changed the outcome of the case. But regardless of one's views on the merits of voter identification laws, surely we would all prefer a judicial system in which some of our most esteemed federal judges did not regret-and blame on inadequate information-their most significant decisions.
